The 2010 National Security Strategy reaffirms U.S. strategic alliances and commitment to key nation-states within the Asia-Pacific region:
Our alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are the bedrock of security in Asia and a foundation of prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. We will continue to deepen and update these alliances to reflect the dynamism of the region and strategic trends of the 21 st century. 2 In view of the instability of the U.S. economy, the implications of which extend well beyond its borders, bilateral and multilateral agreements between allies have never been more critical. Indeed, given the volatile state of most economies, economic survival could overshadow other elements of national security. Competition for resources is forcing hard decisions and causing the United States to demand greater cost sharing among partners within the Asia-Pacific region. Complicated and stifling economic challenges are now forcing a 21 st -century review of the U.S.-Japan Security alliance to keep it legitimate and current. The specific details of precisely how the agreement should or can be implemented is worthy of discussion. For generations, there has been no desire by Japanese political leadership, nor has there been a compelling reason for the United States, to encourage organic military capability beyond Japan's self-defense capability. Uniquely effective for over 50 years, the U.S.-Japan bilateral security alliance is still necessary. Historically, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, and an inwardly focused China, have allowed Japan to take a minimalist approach to its self-defense environment. Unfortunately, the somewhat benign and tolerant environment that allowed for this moderate investment in military capabilities has rapidly changed in recent years. The current global economic climate and military growth of China necessitate a review of U.S. policy and defense strategy to support expansion in Japanese military capability to address 21st century regional threats.
Why Change is Necessary
Recent G20 reports cite an unprecedented undercurrent of global market isolationism. For instance, the U.S. has been unable to arrive at an agreement with South Korea to allow American beef, automobiles and automotive parts to more broadly penetrate its markets. 3 Not since the Great Depression has the United States experienced such global pressure to correct its financial situation, which has eroded since the late 1990s which exacerbates isolationist tendencies. As the United States continues to increase its exports, it is encountering more and more protective measures from importing countries. Isolationist behavior suppresses global economic growth, limits opportunities, and is counter a desired open and prosperous international economic system.
America's economic challenges also threaten national security. Policy-makers and economists need look no further than 2010 U.S. budget deficit to ascertain why equitable distribution of regional security costs and responsibilities have become so important. The U.S. national debt is approaching the $14.3 4 States, under which Japan assumes unilateral responsibility for its own internal security and the United States agrees to defend Japan against an external aggressor attack. 9 The Japanese Constitution authorizes self-defense as a responsibility of its government.
Likewise, U.S. commitment to Japanese and Asia-Pacific stability and security is also specified in the U.S. National Security Strategy: -in partnership with our allies, the United States is helping to offer a future of security and integration to all Asian nations and to uphold and extend fundamental rights and dignity to all of its people.‖ Establishing a new framework for ensuring Japanese and regional security should also dissuade Japan from independently deciding to develop nuclear weapons.
Japan has long stood as a passionate advocate for nuclear non-proliferation. As the only nation to suffer a nuclear attack, it stands firmly behind its constitutionally mandated defensive posture. It also is firmly reliant upon the United States for offensive protection, if attacked. Nonetheless, it is believed that Japan possesses the technological capability to develop nuclear weapons for defensive purposes should the United States become unwilling or unable to protect Japan. 13 It remains in the interest of the United States that Japan does not pursue development of nuclear weapons. Such a decision would likely promote a nuclear arms race in the region, creating significant instability and the potential for catastrophic consequences in any conflict.
Evolving Asia-Pacific Policy and Strategy
The global financial crisis is prompting a holistic review of the ends, ways and means of U.S. National Security Strategy in Asia-Pacific. The United States remains committed to the goal of assuring Asia-Pacific stability through innovative, relevant and burden-sharing cooperative ways. As specifically outlined in the National Security Strategy 2010, -our alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and
Thailand are the bedrock of security in Asia and a foundation of prosperity in the AsiaPacific region--We will continue to deepen and update these alliances to reflect the dynamism of the region and strategic trends of the 21st century.‖ 14 As China's and India's global wealth and regional power increase, policy, strategy and focus will shift global attention and priority from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region.
As the third largest economy in the world, Japan is more than capable of shouldering more regional and global leadership and security responsibility. In the aftermath of 9/11, Japan passed groundbreaking anti-terrorism legislation allowing maritime self-defense forces (SDF) to deploy outside of the Asia-Pacific region. This further indicates Japan's adaptability and willingness to adjust constitutional interpretation to protect Japanese national interests. 15 Under the new anti-terrorism law, Japan has deployed forces to Iraq, has supported piracy interdiction operations off the coast of Somalia, and has conducted refueling operations in the Indian Ocean. 16 For example, Japan's contributions to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) have included refueling support that dates back to 2001 and Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) ground forces deployed. 17 Recent support has also included deployment of medical officers and nurses to Afghanistan. 18 Clearly, Japan is leaning forward and taking on more security responsibilities.
Japanese security transformation is also reflective of, and must remain adaptive to, a changing Asia-Pacific region. With the United States committed in Iraq through 2011, and in Afghanistan through 2014, even more Japanese military investment and selfreliance may be required. To protect its national interests into the future, Japan must be willing to accept these increased responsibilities.
U.S. Forward Deployed Presence Transformation
The changing forward presence of U.S. forces in the Pacific demonstrates commitment to regional allies and partners, and serves as a visible deterrent to potential aggressors, such as North Korea. This strategic posture has served U.S. interests for decades, but the landscape in the Western Pacific is changing. As technology advances and globalization continues to change the world, it is easy to question whether the U.S.
can continue to pay the price required to keep robust presence at so many locations throughout the world. Other factors will also influence the future disposition of U.S.
forces.
For instance, the presence of U.S. Marine Corps forces in Okinawa is an issue is worthy of mention. The negotiations to reconcile the relocation of Futenma airfield have tested both nations for over a decade. 19 For the past five years, the United States has remained firmly committed to keeping forces in Okinawa and continues to work with the Government of Japan and the local officials to find an alternate solution for basing. 20 Continuing with what appeared to be an evident departure from Japan's Article 9 ‗no-war' clause to a more dynamic defense approach, the people elected the second DPJ Prime Minister, Naoto
Kan in June of 2010. 21 Prime Minister Kan and current DPJ representation appear to be more agreeable to increased SDF military capabilities.
For the United States, Okinawa remains a strategic basing location, which serves not only as forward deployed presence for stability, but as a staging area capable of delivering significant combat power in the defense of U.S. interests should the need arise. On January 11, 2011, a new special measures agreement on facilities and area and the status of U.S. forces in Japan was reached. This agreement extended current Japanese cost-sharing levels through 2015 22 and affirmed agreements to relocate Futenma. These agreements remain contingent upon United States Government efforts to relocate 8,000 Marines to Guam, and to relocate and consolidate some 10,000
remaining Marines to bases in the northern Okinawa. 23 The U.S. decision to move forces to Guam will help ease the tensions between the U.S. government and the local population on Okinawa. However, this move does not completely address the overall basing issue. It only begins to touch upon a problem created by Japan's decision to concentrate over 75% of U.S. Forces in Japan on
Okinawa. 24 The Okinawa issue illustrates how the post-Cold War generation in Japan has grown less tolerant to U.S. military presence for deterrence and security purposes. If history is our guide, it is understandable why tensions remain high between regional neighbors. China and Japan's adversarial history dates back centuries.
Ninetieth and twentieth century conflict included two Sino-Japanese wars primarily motivated by an emerging and industrializing Japan and its imperialistic quest to gain land and access to resources to increase its security. Japan acquired an annexed and pro-Japanese Korean peninsula, and continued its imperialistic quest to secure resources in the second Sino-Japanese war that led up to World War II. 27 waterway that handles over 50% of all merchant shipping tonnage throughout the world. 28 China based its claim on 1930s-era territorial maps of the entire SCS as proof that it belonged to the PRC. 29 China's claim remains unrecognized and incidents between China and regional countries continue.
At an October 2010 meeting hosted by Vietnam in Hanoi, leaders from 18 countries gathered at a U.S.-led meeting to discuss settlement of disputed territorial waters between China and neighboring countries, notably Japan and Vietnam. 30 The
United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the legal framework for a peaceful resolution of disputes relating to maritime security cooperation. 31 The UNCLOS charter requires that all members of the United Nations resolve maritime disputes peacefully. Japan, China, and the United States are among the 161 countries that have ratified UNCLOS. At the forefront of China's contested sovereignty dispute are fishing rights, ownership of remote islands, access to seabed's that are potentially rich in minerals, and freedom of international waterways. 32 This aggressive Chinese declaration of sovereignty accompanied by provocation and lack of transparency in its military build-up are causes for regional and global concern. Stability in the Asia-Pacific region is paramount to the United States and its allies, and it is a professed concern of China as well. However, China's actions indicate otherwise and regional states are taking note.
U.S.-China Relations
Based on past performance and unwillingness to change, the lack of strategic transparency surrounding China's military build-up will only foster by speculation and doubt. China does not publish anything comparable to the U.S. National Security People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) capabilities that focus on its anti-access or areadenial capabilities. 34 Understandably, as China's wealth grows, so will its desire to expand influence and secure future interests. Regardless of the source of the threat, missile defense remains a key issue in the U.S. relationship with Japan. Japan's constitution clearly distinguishes self-defense, however, Japan has not constitutional obligation to intercept missiles launched over Japanese airspace destined for the United States. 44 As technology increases and Japan develops space and missile capabilities that extend beyond self-defense, this constitutional constraint arguably should be resolved.
Geostrategic Environmental Factors
The concept behind Sir Halford Mackinder's ‗geopolitical pivot area' has helped shape policy and grand strategy for over a century. Mackinder's ‗pivot area,' more commonly known as the ‗Heartland' theory, posits that -he who controls the heartland, controls the World Island (Eurasia and Africa); he who controls the World Island, controls the World.‖ 45 This strategic maxim remains relevant in today's environment.
Alfred Thayer Mahan discussed the importance of the global commons and the capacity of sea power to facilitate peaceful trade. Clausewitz wrote that war is a continuation of policy through other means. He contended that war is simple, and that the simplest things can be the most difficult to achieve, especially if the relationship between ends and means becomes obscured by a failure to reach political objectives. Policy frames the overall strategic objectives specific to states and non-state threats. Opening the aperture and focusing on larger territories or regions to inform policy creates a desired geostrategic perspective and focus.
The ‗Tyranny of Distance' between the United States and allies in the AsiaPacific region is in fact sufficient reason to maintain a forward-deployed presence.
Additionally, the Asia-Pacific region's geostrategic importance is resides in its contribution to free trade and access to global markets. To avoid future conflict in AsiaPacific, regional partnerships and alliances with India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan and other regional allies remains strategically critical to assure free trade and the flow of commerce. The Strait of Malacca is the ‗Fulda Gap' of the twenty-firstcentury; it is where almost all shipping lanes between the Red Sea and the Sea of Japan converge, and where as much as 50% of all energy-related traffic will transit by the year 2020. 46 As the U.S. continues to reduce its presence in South Korea and Japan, it is vitally important that the U.S. maintain flexible strategic basing forward to sustain commerce flow through the Strait of Malacca and continue honoring security agreements with regional partners.
Design is an element of geostrategic environmental framing. In today's terms, While the United States historically invested wealth and capital to achieve military superiority, Japan limited its defense budget investments to less than one percent of its GDP. 49 Unavoidably, the current U.S. economic crisis means that U.S. allies must assume a greater share of costs of security. Cooperative bilateral and multilateral agreements with regional partners and allies can facilitate a more equitable distribution of leadership, resource expenditure, and overall security responsibility. In spite of this, a regional approach to security cannot and will not occur without open and honest debate.
Consequence Management
Holistically, China's rise to power and accompanying lack of transparency leave little room for miscalculation in the development and execution of an off-setting U.S.
policy and global strategy-and particularly Asia-Pacific strategy. Estimates indicate that
China is at least ten to fifteen years behind the United States in technology and the capability to project power beyond its borders. But, without more transparency, these figures remain estimates. The U.S. must forge ahead with alliances and agreements to guarantee its security, the security of its allies, continued prosperity based on deterrence, balancing coalitions and alliances, and continued unhindered free trade.
In support of Japan's urgency to increase self-defense of its homeland and territories, Tokyo must come to grips with its constitution and aging cultural bias as a ‗defensive state' that has forever renounced offensive capabilities. Due in large part to fiscal pressures that have mounted over the last decade, the United States will likely continue reducing forward presence globally with a goal of offsetting force level reductions with increased defensive capabilities.
An additional challenge to reduced presence at forward bases is deployment restrictions placed on U.S. forces by the host nations. The South Korean government has enforced political restrictions on U.S. military moves and has suggested that U.S.
forces could not deploy without prior approval. 50 Japan has yet to impose the same restrictions; however, as tensions rise it is not beyond reason that Japan would attempt to exercise the same restrictions. Future basing of U.S. forward deployed forces should and should include flexibility to allow full utilization of all U.S. capabilities wherever and whenever required. Over the past three decades the strategic landscape of the world has transformed. The Asia-Pacific region has replaced the Atlantic as the engine of global trade and power following the collapse of Soviet Union and the subsequent rise of Japan, South Korea, and China, and an emerging India. 51 As the global strategic landscape has changed, so also must the U.S. role as the world's superpower likewise change.
Recommendations
The world becomes more volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous with each passing day. Without question, the current fiscal crisis that the United States is facing will necessitate cuts in the U.S. defense budget, as well as unprecedented fiscal cuts across the entire U.S. Government. Forward-based U.S. forces across the globe have been reduced dramatically over the past two decades and it is reasonable to expect that fiscal pressures will force the United States to remain focused on opportunities to reduce force levels even further. Aggressive defense-related research, development, and deployment of emerging capabilities must remain a priority for both United States and Japan, with both nations sharing the costs of meeting emerging regional threats. should work forward an acceptable compromise to strengthen relations and achieve mutual defensive flexibility.
Japan and the United States should seize this opportunity and focus on the fundamental obstacle that is preventing the Japanese from further military build-up: its constitution. Specifically, language that addresses Japanese aspiration to forever renounce threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes, 54 should be amended. Additionally, the Japanese and U.S. governments should continue to assess and identify opportunities for reprogramming host-nation support into more robust conventional capabilities that complement those already deployed in the region by the United States. Although Japan possesses the technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons, instead, Japan should invest in other capabilities.
Besides reducing the forward-deployed force, the United States should continue to invest in the infrastructure needed to optimize the strategic utility of Guam's location.
By leveraging of Guam as a U.S. territory, the United States retains flexibility to deploy forces to any Asia-Pacific location without host-nation restrictions.
BMD, in terms of ways, offers a potential opportunity for the United States to reduce forward-deployed forces, strengthen cooperation with an allied partner, and an opportunity for Japan to enhance its security and self-sufficiency. In October 2010, the JS KIRISHIMA Aegis Cruiser, equipped with the U.S. Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) ballistic missile defense system upgrade, successfully located and destroyed a medium-range theater ballistic missile over the waters of Hawaii. 55 With four Japanese cruisers configured with the latest Aegis BMD system and more planned, Japan continues to enhance its naval missile defense capabilities. Additionally, Japan announced intentions in December 2010 to expand land-based U.S. Patriot PAC-3 systems to increase capability to defend against emerging North Korean ballistic missile threats. 56 Increased BMD investment actions demonstrate cost sharing, leadership and self-sufficiency and are supportive of Japanese desires to maintain strong self-defense capabilities as U.S.
economic recovery continues-these and similar BMD initiatives should be sustained. A better combined investment would be increased BMD capabilities to mutually protect regional allies or even the United States territories. As the Japanese constitution reads today, it is questionable, given future technological advancement in BMD, whether Japan would use that capability to defend another nation or ally.
Conclusion
Current Japanese constitutional language prevents the Japanese from pursuing
military capabilities beyond what is required to provide defense of homeland and territories. In the event the U.S. becomes unwilling or unable to provide Japan with adequate security from emerging regional aggressors, this language should be amended. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law passed by Japan's Diet following the 9/11attacks has nudged Japan's self-defense capability in a positive direction.
However, Japan's constitution still stands in the way of true progress needed to forge a U.S.-Japan partnership that meets emerging 21 st traditional and non-traditional threats to security. Since WWII, the United States has shouldered the burden of global leadership and has been the predominant provider of world stability and security.
Terrorism, natural disasters, the global financial crises, two wars, and expanding domestic programs have all contributed in some way to the accumulation of unprecedented U.S. debt. As a nation, the U.S. risks losing the legitimacy of its global leadership role if economic difficulties continue or worsen. Smart decisions to change U.S. spending habits, better alignment of means to achieve strategic ends, and a more adaptable 21
stcentury regional security architecture could foster future tranquility, prosperity, and the continued blessings of liberty to the U.S. and the world. As the global environment changes, changes to U.S. policy and defense strategy must consider an adaptable approach to burden-sharing for regional security in the Asia Pacific region with Japan.
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